I. Preliminary Remarks

141. As to the solution of this question [nn.124-140] I proceed thus: first I distinguish between theology in itself and theology in us; second I will designate the idea of its first subject; third I will distinguish theology into its parts.

[About theology in itself and in us] - On the first point I say that any science taken in itself is that which is naturally had of the object of the science in accord with the way the object naturally manifests itself to an intellect commensurate with it; now doctrine for us is what is naturally had in our intellect about the object. Therefore theology in itself is the sort of knowledge that the object of theology naturally produces in an intellect commensurate with itself; but theology in us is the sort of knowledge that our intellect naturally has about the object. - An example: if some intellect could not understand geometrical matters yet could believe someone else about geometrical matters, geometry for it would be faith, not science; however geometry in itself would be a science, because the object of geometry naturally produces science of itself in an intellect commensurate with it.

142. [On the Idea of the First Object] - On the second point I say that the nature of the first object is to be what first contains virtually in itself all the truths of the habit of the science. Which I prove thus: first, that the first object contains the immediate propositions, because the subject of those propositions contains the predicate, and thus it contains the evidence for the whole proposition; now immediate propositions contain the conclusions; therefore the subject of the immediate propositions contains all the truths of the habit of the science.

143. I make the same clear in a second way thus, that ‘firstness’ is here taken from Posterior Analytics 1 ch.4 73b32-33, from the definition of ‘universal’ in the sense in which ‘universal’ indicates adequacy: the object Note by Scotus added before ‘the object’: “He proceeds to a difficulty about the causality of the object, and, as this is omitted here, say.” ⁴⁵would not be adequate to the habit unless it virtually contained everything that such a habit inclines one to consider, because, if it did not, the habit would exceed the object.[A note that Scotus cancelled here reads: “but the object is related to the habit as cause to effect; now a cause is not adequate unless it virtually contains the whole effect; therefore etc.” The note was cancelled by Scotus because of the addition just made: “He proceeds to a difficulty about the causality of the object.”] ⁴⁶

144. By the phrase ‘first.. .virtually’ [n.142], I mean that it is first in the sense that it does not depend on another but other things depend on it; in this sense, then, ‘first contains’ means that, in its containing, it does not depend on other things but other things depend on it, that is, that if,per impossibile, all other things in the idea of the object were removed and only it remained understood, it would still objectively contain them. But it does not contain anything else save through its idea.

145. That its essence, once known with the habit of science, contains ‘first virtually’ the knowledge of all the truths of the habit:

The habit that is called science is an intelligible likeness (species) of the first object; it regards immediate truths and mediate ones, not formally, but by implication, and its formally adequate object is the quiddity of which it is the likeness. What wonder, then, if the first object, qua known, contains the knowledge of the things which its intelligible species moves one, although mediately, to consider? Nay rather, it is the same thing for the intelligible species of A to contain virtually knowledge of B, and for the A itself, as known with the habit of science, to contain it, that is, that the intelligible species of the A itself in memory is able to generate knowledge of B in the intelligence. In this way, then, the first object of the intellect and of the science are the same; and then the first object distinguishes, not them, but what proximately follows them, which is immediate and mediate truth, and the first object of the two of them is related in a certain order to the proximate objects and to the habit of science of the proximate objects. In this way it is impossible to use the habit of the science save by using first in nature, and also in time, the habit of intellect, because I never contemplate anything in scientific knowledge save by considering it as true, evident to me because of some other truth. Either, then, they are the same habit, and I first use the habit about the object to which it first inclines me (nay rather, according to Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 9 q.4, both are the same as the habit which is the quiddity of the first simple object, which habit you say is called science by Aristotle in his distinction of sciences);This opinion of Henry’s is discussed and rejected by Scotus in Metaphysics 6 q.1 nn.3-7. ⁴⁷ or they are more than one habit - nay rather, any truth at all has its own habit, and, in addition to it, there is the habit of the quiddity of the first object, which you say is the intelligible likeness, and it virtually includes all of the habits - and then he who uses the later habit must at the same time be using all the prior ones.

Can it be, then, that a habit, when compared with many acts or with one act, has an act proper to both of what it is compared with? And, besides this, an act of comparing it as well with that chief act of discursive reasoning? - My own proper act is set down as that whereby I am inclined to perform a demonstration, that is, to infer this from that; for which extremes I have two acts; look for the passage with the triangular mark below, against Henry of Ghent and Richard of St. Victor [1 d.2 p.2 q1.4 nn.35, 36] - If a plurality of habits may be made sense of, a fewness of them should be preferred.

146. On the contrary, namely against the designation of the above posited idea of the first object [nn.142-145], there are two arguments. First thus: as the first object is to the power, so is the first object to the habit; but the first object of the power is something common to all the per se objects of that power; therefore the first object of the habit is something common to all its objects, and not something that virtually contains other things.

147. Again second: because what is commonly designated for first object in the sciences is something that is common to all the things that are considered in that science, as line is in geometry, number in arithmetic, being in metaphysics.

148. To the first argument [n.146] I reply and say that the way the object is commensurate with the power is the way the mover is commensurate with the thing moved, or the way the active thing is commensurate with the passive; the way the object is commensurate with the habit is the way the cause is commensurate with the effect. Now whenever some agent acts on some patient, any agent also of the same nature can act on any patient of the same nature. Therefore the first extremes of the commensurate relation of the active thing to the passive thing are common to all the per se extremes of that relation; for among those most common things is adequacy, because anything that the nature of one is in has regard to anything that the nature of the other is in. But the first extremes of the commensurate relation of cause to effect are not most common, because there is no adequacy between them; for not anything contained under what is common has respect to the habit as to its effect, but only some first object or content does, which virtually respects or contains everything that the habit extends itself to.

149. To the second argument [n.147] I reply that, in the case of many habits differing in species, there can be some common object in the way that from their objects an object that is common can be extracted; and in this way there is a common object designated in the sciences that gives rise to a habit, not one in species, but only one in genus.

150. [On the Parts of Theology] - On the third [n.141] I say that theology not only contains things that are necessary but also things that are contingent. The matter is plain, because all the truths about God relating to what is extrinsic to him, whether they are about him as triune or about any of the divine persons, are contingent, as that God creates, that the Son is incarnate, and the like; but all the truths about God as triune or as a determinate person are theological, because they have regard to no human science; therefore the first integral parts of theology are two, namely truths necessary and truths contingent.